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Critics of campaign finance in the United States
often direct their fire toward contributors who make
large donations. Critics charge that large contribu-
tions are unfair, unrepresentative, and undemocrat-
ic. Accordingly, they push for “reforms” that would
favor small contributions over large, and public
money over private donations.
Survey data on contributors contradict that
stereotype of contributors of large amounts and
their effects on American politics. Overall, “fat
cats” differ less from contributors of smaller
amounts than critics have alleged. The differ-
ences that do exist are mostly unsurprising and
generally small in magnitude. Survey results
show that both policy liberalism and
Democratic partisanship are well represented
among contributors of large sums.
The supporters of McCain-Feingold argue
that new restrictions on large contributions will
profoundly alter American politics for the bet-
ter. Their claims have no basis in fact. New laws
aimed at restricting large donations in favor of
smaller ones will have little effect on practical
politics.
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Introduction
One of the most enduring stereotypes in
American politics is the “fat cat,” the wealthy
campaign contributor. From the robber
barons of the gilded age to the corporate rich
of the mid-20th century to the purveyors of
soft money in the 1990s, those who donate
large sums have a firm place in the mytholo-
gy, if not the reality, of American elections.
Fat cats are prime suspects in the conspiracy
theories of the left and right, potent props
for cynics of every persuasion, and the great
bane of all reformers. Political scientists fre-
quently focus on fat cats as well, assigning
large contributions a prominent place in
explanations of political power and party
coalitions. Such assertions are rarely based
on more than anecdote and conjecture.1
This paper juxtaposes the fat-cat stereo-
type with an empirical picture based on sur-
vey data. We have collected a national sample
of donors to competitive congressional races
and public records of their subsequent feder-
al donations. We use those data to describe
the political and social correlates of donors
across the gamut of contributions.
We conclude that new laws aimed at restrict-
ing large donations in favor of smaller ones will
have only modest effect on practical politics.
Criticisms of Contributors
of Large Sums
Critics of fat cats in American politics
argue that contributions influence cam-
paigns and the policies proposed and passed
by elected officials. Money in politics, they
say, has the same effect it has in the market-
place: the more money people spend, the
more influence they can “buy.” If that is so,
contributors of large amounts are especially
influential in politics by virtue of their finan-
cial largesse. 
Critics decry this influence because they
believe democracy and fairness require all citi-
zens to have an equal opportunity to influence
policymaking.2 In this view, large donations
are unfair and undemocratic because personal
wealth is distributed unequally among citi-
zens, which gives the wealthy more opportu-
nity to affect the political process.3 Critics also
believe that money has relatively more influ-
ence on politics than other resources, which
are more evenly distributed, such as votes,
time, energy, or wisdom.4 When push comes
to shove, the critics say, the special potency of
large donations can overcome other efforts by
less affluent citizens.
Critics also believe that fat cats give in
pursuit of private, selfish interests. “Big
money” pursues material concerns, allowing
donors to seek to maximize personal returns
from their political “investments” rather
than pursue a more public-spirited agenda.5
Moreover, large donations make the political
system less representative of the public as a
whole, even if they are made with a broader
agenda in mind. The wealthy are different
from you and me, the critics claim, and not
just because they have more money. They
have different class interests, are more con-
servative, and are likely to support the
Republican Party.6
Because large contributions are unfair,
undemocratic, corrupt, and unrepresenta-
tive, critics have sought and obtained limits
on the size and level of individual contribu-
tions. They believe that smaller donations are
more fair, democratic, public spirited, and
representative. Government financing of
campaigns supported by voluntary income
tax check-offs represents the logical exten-
sion of such thinking: individual contribu-
tions in such systems are nearly equal and
too small to threaten other forms of partici-
pation, garner special favors, or overrepresent
special interests. Those who give small dona-
tions, “thin kittens,” are thus seen as much
better for the functioning of the political sys-
tem than fat cats.
What does the scholarly literature have to
say about these assumptions, conclusions, and
corollaries regarding fat cats? First, scholars
offer a series of qualifications to the critics’
broad assertions about the power of money in
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politics. For example, studies reveal that money
affects electoral outcomes ambiguously and
indirectly; campaign spending often matters
less for well-financed candidates than for those
who are less well funded.7 Similarly, studies
show that money affects legislative behavior in
complex ways; one of many influences, money
is rarely the most important and is often incon-
sequential.8
Second, research on campaign contribu-
tors reveals a more complex picture. On the
one hand, donors as a group differ substan-
tially from the general public; they are far
more affluent and politically active.9 Indeed,
giving even a small amount puts an individ-
ual in the activist corps, and other kinds of
activists also differ from the general public in
a similar fashion.10 On the other hand,
donors are quite diverse politically, represent-
ing a wide variety of attitudes, motivations,
and forms of activism.11
This analysis looks at the criticisms of large
contributors by testing three hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: Givers of large donations
should be much wealthier than contrib-
utors of smaller amounts (and thus
their participation is potentially unfair
and undemocratic).
• Hypothesis 2: Givers of large donations
should be motivated more by material
and instrumental concerns than con-
tributors of smaller amounts (and thus
their participation is potentially venal).
• Hypothesis 3: Givers of large donations
should have different attitudes than
contributors of smaller amounts.
Specifically, we would expect givers of
large donations to espouse conservative
economic views and be Republican par-
tisans (and thus their participation is
potentially unrepresentative of the pub-
lic as a whole).
Findings
We sampled campaign contributors from
past elections and surveyed them to test
those conjectures. The Appendix describes
our sampling approach and the subsequent
survey of contributors that underpins this
study. We turn now to assessing each hypoth-
esis in light of our data.
Hypothesis 1: Givers of Large Donations
Are Wealthier Than Contributors of
Smaller Amounts
Table 1 presents demographic differences
between contributors of small, moderate, and
large amounts. Small contributions were less
than $500, moderate contributions were from
$501 to $5,000, and large contributions were
$5,001 or more. The contributors of large
amounts are more likely to be male, less likely
to belong to a labor union (although very few
contributors in any category do), and more
likely to be over 60 years of age. The occupa-
tional data are interesting. Contributors of
large amounts are a bit more likely to be
employed in private-sector businesses and a
bit less likely to be employed in government.
They are also a little more likely to be lawyers.
One variable, however, overwhelms all the
others: income. Ninety-four percent of con-
tributors of large amounts make more than
$100,000 annually. Campaign contributions
are, in other words, what economists call a
“normal good”: you consume more of them
as your income increases. As the term
implies, this finding is about the most unsur-
prising one imaginable.12 As might be expect-
ed, contributors of large sums are wealthier
than donors of smaller amounts and the
public at large.
Hypothesis 2: Givers of Large Donations
Should Be Motivated More by Material
and Instrumental Concerns Than
Contributors of Smaller Amounts
Table 2 explores the motivations of contrib-
utors by looking at what respondents said
prompted their contributions to political cam-
paigns. We asked whether various factors were
“very important,” “important,” “somewhat
important,” or “not important” to their deci-
sion to contribute. Not all the alternatives
offered are very interesting or theoretically
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important. We wanted to give respondents
plenty of opportunity to offer widely acceptable
“goody two-shoes” answers, in the hope that
they would then be more forthcoming about
self-interested motivations.
In fact, the givers of small contributions
were a bit more likely to admit self-interested
motivations. They were more likely to say that
they would contribute to a candidate who
would “do a good job of watching out for the
interests of the district” (the “state” in Senate
elections), more likely to admit that they sup-
ported incumbents, and more concerned that a
candidate would, if elected, “be accessible to
constituents.” Givers of large donations were a
bit higher on “the candidate is reasonably
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics
Small Moderate Large
Characteristic Contributors Contributors Contributors Tau-b Significance*
Male 69.3% 78.0% 84.8% .12 .001
Black 1.6% 1.3% 0.9% .01 no
Hispanic 0.6% 1.0% 0.6% .01 no
Asian 1.3% 1.7% 1.9% .01 no
Union member 5.1% 0.7% 0.6% .11 .001
Occupation:
professional
or managerial 76.4% 81.6% 80.1% no
Sector of employment
Self-employed 44.7% 49.6% 46.6% —
Government
employee 14.0% 4.7% 2.3% —
Private-sector
business
employee 34.9% 42.4% 48.0% —
Private,
nonprofit
employee 6.2% 3.3% 3.0% .001
At least some
graduate training 56.3% 57.5% 59.9% .05
Family income over
$100,000 per year 50.1% 80.5% 94.1% 0.33 0.00†
Religion
Protestant 45.2% 47.5% 46.3% .01 no
Catholic 23.6% 19.7% 17.4% .05 .01
Jewish 11.5% 18.0% 18.3% .08 .001
Consider self “not
really religious” 25.5% 23.5% 25.9% .00 no
Consider self
“fundamentalist” 5.0% 3.5% 1.9% .05 .01
Age: over 60 34.7% 39.3% 42.7% .06 .001
A lawyer 15.9% 26.2% 25.2% .11 .001
*Significance of Tau-b coefficient, which indicates the probability that this relationship with ordinal data is
merely the result of chance.
†Significance of chi-square, which indicates the probability that this relationship with nominal data is merely the
result of chance.
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Motivations for Contribution (percentage who said particular factor was “very important”)
Small Moderate Large
Item Contributors Contributors Contributors Tau-b Significance*
Candidate “would be effective in 
getting things done in Congress” 53.4 52.0 47.5 .03 no
Candidate “generally agrees with
me on policy questions” 32.6 30.7 28.3 .02 no
Candidate “has the very highest
ethical standards” 67.6 69.9 69.7 0.02 no
Candidate “will do a good job of watching
out for the interests of the state [district]” 33.9 31.6 26.5 0.05 0.01
Candidate “is reasonably friendly toward 
the interests of people in my industry or 
line of work” 17.4 18.6 20.3 0.02 no
Candidate “will exercise independent
judgment on policy questions” 49.8 53.1 41.9 0 no
Candidate “is running against an opponent 
that I find unacceptable” 31.5 39.0 23.4 0.02 no
Candidate “is an incumbent” 3.3 4.0 1.3 0.07 0.05
Candidate “will (if elected) be accessible
to constituents” 33.5 29.4 19.3 0.08 0.01
Candidate “agrees with me on one (or a few)
very  important issues.” 33.0 32.5 35.1 0 no
*Significance of Tau-b coefficient.
Table 3
Circumstances of Contribution
Small Moderate Large
Item Contributors Contributors Contributors Tau-b Significance*
Got request in mail 37.3% 32.1% 36.0% .03 no
Someone working for the campaign
(not known to me personally) called
to ask for a contribution 6.0% 6.0% 4.7% .01 no
I attended a fundraising event (such
as a dinner, coffee, or reception) 24.6% 28.5% 25.5% .02 no
An economic interest group (union,
corporation) or trade association 
supported the candidate 38.9% 39.9% 30.7% .03 no
An interest group promoting a 
particular cause supported 
the candidate 6.4% 5.5% 5.9% .01 no
People where I work were encouraged
to contribute to [name of candidate] 11.5% 9.1% 8.1% .04 .05
I made the contribution on my own initiative 4.9% 3.5% 2.5% .04 .05
*Significance of Tau-b coefficient.
friendly toward the interests of people in my
industry or line of work,” but the difference is
not statistically significant. On net, we have lit-
tle evidence that givers of large amounts and
contributors of smaller sums have fundamen-
tally different motives for giving.
However, thus far the analysis has been
based on respondents’ own, perhaps self-serv-
ing, accounts of their motivations. A different
approach is to ask respondents about the con-
crete proximate circumstances that accompa-
nied a particular campaign contribution. In
Tables 3 and 4, we see respondents’ accounts of
the circumstances surrounding a single contri-
bution they made in 1988 to a single candidate. 
Little in these data supports the notion
that fat cats are any different from people who
make smaller contributions. The only two dif-
ferences that reach statistical significance are
the fact that the latter were more likely to say
that “people where I work were encouraged to
contribute” and that they were also more like-
ly to say that they made the contribution on
their own initiative. In regard to the first dif-
ference, one imagines apolitical business exec-
utives dutifully making a contribution to
some candidate the company’s chief lobbyist
urges them to support. In regard to the sec-
ond, one assumes that the people who make
smaller contributions are on fewer lists of like-
ly contributors and thus not so relentlessly
solicited as the fat cats.
Hypothesis 3: Givers of Large Donations
Should Have Different Attitudes Than
Contributors of Smaller Amounts 
We would expect givers of large donations
to be more conservative and Republican than
contributors of smaller amounts. The data
presented in Table 5 yield a rather clear pic-
ture. Fat cats are a bit more economically
conservative, perhaps a bit more conservative
in foreign policy, and not significantly differ-
ent on social and racial issues. Two different
forms of the questionnaire asked about poli-
cy preferences in two different ways. Form A
asked people whether they were liberal or
conservative on four different issue areas: (1)
economics, (2) social issues, (3) foreign poli-
cy, and (4) racial issues. As can be seen, the fat
cats were about ten percentage points less
likely to call themselves “liberal” on econom-
ic issues13 and about nine percentage points
less likely to call themselves “liberal” on for-
eign policy issues.14 Neither social issues nor
racial issues show any statistically significant
pattern of differences. Fat cats were also
modestly more Republican than the donors
of smaller amounts—by about eight percent-
age points. Looked at another way, there are
almost as many liberals and Democrats
among donors of smaller amounts as among
fat cats, despite the greater conservatism and
Republicanism of the latter.
We should keep in mind, however, that
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Table 4
How People Who Attended a Fundraising Event Came to Do So
Small Moderate Large
Item Contributors Contributors Contributors Tau-b Significance*
I got an invitation in the mail 53.2% 53.1% 50.5% .01 no
A friend or acquaintance invited me 42.2% 43.2% 41.4% 00 no
An economic interest group or trade
association encouraged me to attend 7.5% 6.2% 13.1% .02 no
An issue-oriented interest group that
I belong to sponsored the event 8.0% 6.2% 10.1% .00 no
People where I work were encouraged to attend 3.8% 4.6% 2.0% .00 no
*Significance of Tau-b coefficient.
contemporary liberalism is more than govern-
ment activism in the economy and dovishness
in foreign policy. About one-third of fat cats in
our sample identified themselves as liberal on
social and racial issues. In general, they were
not significantly less liberal on social and
racial issues than givers of smaller amounts.
On the whole, we might conclude that con-
tributors of large sums are slightly less liberal
than donors of smaller amounts. That cau-
tious conclusion, however, flies in the face of
the rhetoric and expectations of people who
support limits on “big money.” 
If we turn from people’s general labels to
Table 5
Partisanship and Policy Preferences
Small Moderate Large
Item Contributors Contributors Contributors Tau-b Significance*
Democratic Party identification 39.7% 33.9% 34.6%
Republican Party identification 43.7% 50.5%5 51.7% .06 .01
Claims to be “liberal” or “very liberal” on
“economic issues” 28.6% 18.3% 17.4% .12 .001
Claims to be “liberal or “very liberal” on
“social issues” 40.9% 38.1% 34.5% .04 no
Claims to be “liberal” or “very liberal” on
“foreign policy issues” 30.0% 18.3% 21.1% .09 .001
Claims to be “liberal” or “very liberal” on
“racial issues” 40.5% 33.3% 34.7% .04 no
A Ronald Reagan supporter 45.8% 51.8% 53.7% .06 .01
A Jesse Jackson supporter 7.5% 2.5% 2.5% .09 .001
A Pat Robertson supporter 2.8% 1.7% 1.2% .04 .05
A labor union supporter 10.8% 7.5% 7.8% .04 .01
Agrees that “the United States is spending
too much on defense” 59.0% 59.3% 57.0% .02 no
Supports school prayer constitutional 
amendment 30.7% 31.4% 27.9% .00 no
Wants “affirmative action programs . . . 
pursued much more vigorously” 32.3% 29.5% 26.6% .03 no
Says the United States “should never 
have supported the Contra rebels” 37.8% 29.0% 27.5% .07 .01
Says government should “take strong action” 
to “limit or abolish the practice of abortion” 20.6% 16.4% 17.0% .00 no
Agrees that “public policy should discourage 
the ownership and use of handguns.” 56.4% 59.8% 60.9% .03 no
Says that “a comprehensive national health 
insurance program would be a serious mistake” 35.7% 44.6% 50.3% .09 .001
Says that “busing to integrate the public schools 
has done more harm than good” 43.5% 49.0% 48.8% .03 no
Favors “a substantial increase in the federal 
minimum wage” 34.7% 25.5% 25.2% .09 .01
Agrees that “what this country needs is more
governmental planning of the economy” 20.1% 3.5% 0.0% .10 .01
*Significance of Tau-b coefficient.
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their positions on various specific issues, we
find the same pattern. Fat cats are a bit more
conservative on government economic plan-
ning, the minimum wage, and national health
insurance. They are a bit less likely to label
themselves “union supporters.” Responses to
specific foreign policy questions paint a mixed
picture. Fat cats are a bit less likely to say that
the United States “should never have supported
the Contra rebels in Nicaragua” but no less like-
ly to say that the United States “is spending too
much on defense.” All groups seem to share in
the belief that the military establishment built
up to fight the Cold War could be downsized
following the collapse of communism.
Finally, we turn to the intensity of opinion
among different strata of contributors. Are
the contributors of large amounts more likely
to have strong political views, to resist com-
promise, and to insist that their party must
take strong positions that satisfy them, or are
they (conversely) more inclined to compro-
mise than other classes of contributors?
Table 6 shows some evidence that contribu-
tors of smaller amounts are more adamant in
their political views. For example, they are a bit
more likely to say that they would rather “lose
an election” than “compromise [their] basic
philosophy.” By similarly modest margins, they
are less likely to be able to “overlook policy dif-
ferences” in order to “support [their] party’s
candidate.” Conversely, they are more likely to
insist that they must “agree with the candidate
on major policy issues.” On the other hand,
they are less likely to claim “strong political
views.” They are also more willing to say that
“the major political parties are run for the ben-
efit of powerful special interests.”
Conclusion
Are the fat cats different from you and
me? Yes, they have more money. And to the
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Table 6
Attitudes toward the Political Process
Small Moderate Large
Item Contributors Contributors Contributors Tau-b Significance*
Would “rather lose an election” than 
“compromise my basic philosophy” 71.5% 68.9% 63.5% .05 .01
Says that “the best thing” about American
political parties is that they “have room 
for every point of view” 45.5% 45.6% 44.6% .01 no
Says that “parties ought to take strong, clear
stands on important public issues” 89.9% 91.1% 87.1% .03 no
Says that “the American political system makes
real change much too difficult” 53.7% 47.1% 51.0% .05 .01
Says that “the major political parties are mainly
run for the benefit of powerful special interests” 42.1% 30.3% 20.2% .16 .001
Leans toward “almost always [can] support . . . 
party’s candidate and are willing to
“overlook policy differences” 10.2% 10.7% 18.0%
Center position 44.4% 44.8% 45.3%
Leans toward “must agree with the candidate on
major policy issues” 45.4% 45.5% 36.9% .05 .01
Claims to have “strong political views” 58.4% 61.1% 73.0% .08 .001
*Significance of Tau-b coefficient.
extent that their greater income allows them
to be more active in politics, the critics may
have a point. It is possible, though far from
proven, that higher income may bring some
unfairness and undemocratic participation
into the political process. 
But the systemic consequences of such
participation by fat cats are far from clear.
It is true that fat cats are a bit more eco-
nomically conservative than contributors of
smaller amounts. But an analysis of some of
our findings suggests that the differences
may not be very important. For example,
contributors of large sums are more opposed
to government planning of the economy, but
very few people in any group of contributors
like such government planning. Fat cats are
more opposed to increasing the minimum
wage, but an increase in the minimum wage
sailed through Congress in 1996 because of
its public popularity—fat-cat opinion
notwithstanding. Fat cats are less likely to
favor government health insurance, but
Clinton’s health care proposal went down to
defeat when public opinion turned against
it—something that was probably inevitable
when the complexities were aired.
It is difficult to see, however, how people
who make frequent and rather large contri-
butions to political candidates, parties, and
political action committees differ very much
from those whose gifts are fewer and smaller.
Reducing the power of the fat cats in favor of
contributors of smaller amounts would not
change the balance of power between liberals
and conservatives much.
Our findings do, however, undermine the
conventional stereotype of the maker of large
campaign contributions. On the whole, such
contributors may be slightly less liberal than mak-
ers of smaller contributions, but fat cats hardly fit
the mold of conservative Republicans dead set
against social and racial progress; giving more to
campaigns does not preclude giving to advance
Democratic candidates and liberal causes. 
Compared with people who make small con-
tributions, people who make large donations
seem a bit more pragmatist than purist in their
orientation—although the differences are mod-
est at best. That is not because fat cats are venal-
ly motivated, while contributors of smaller
amounts are motivated by purposive concerns.
As we have seen, the distribution of motivations
seems to vary only trivially across groups.
Our findings—like those of almost any
inquiry into this issue—have some implica-
tions for recently passed campaign finance
reform legislation. The rhetoric from many
reformers stressed the need to limit the power
of “big money.” It’s an interesting question
whether the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
will actually reduce the power of fat cats,
because while it targets “soft money” it actual-
ly eases restrictions on the more useful and
versatile “hard money.” But even if we assume
for the sake of argument that it will actually
redistribute power from those who contribute
larger amounts to those who contribute less—
or vice versa—the actual policy implications
would likely be minor. Restricting the contrib-
utors of large sums in favor of donors of
smaller amounts will not the change the polit-
ical landscape very much, if at all.
Appendix: Surveying
Campaign Contributors
Our study starts with a sample of cam-
paign contributors that was obtained from
the files of the Federal Election Commission.
We surveyed contributors by mail, using the
mailing addresses in FEC records. The pri-
mary sampling unit was a 1988 race (for the
House or Senate), and we sampled contribu-
tors to both the Democratic and the
Republican candidate for each race.
For the Senate races, we chose 10 states by
a random process. This yielded 20 campaigns
that were part of the sample. For the House,
we chose 20 races by a random process. This
yielded only 35 campaigns (since in 5 of the
chosen races an incumbent was running
without major party opposition). In addi-
tion, an oversample of 10 competitive House
races was drawn. This was done to guarantee
reasonable representation of an exceptionally
interesting class of contributors.
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For each candidacy in the sample, we drew
names from FEC records of contributors
who gave money during 1988. We set an over-
all target of 100 names for each Senate can-
didacy. For each House candidacy, the target
was 30 names. We examined all preelection
contributor reports and drew a roughly equal
number of names from each report of 1988
contributors. However, since the sample was
drawn during December 1988, no postelec-
tion reports were included.
If four reports filed during 1988 con-
tained the names of contributors, the target
for a particular campaign was divided by
four, and this became the “report target”: the
number of names to be drawn from each
report. In a typical Senate case, 25 names
were drawn from each of four reports. If
insufficient names were found in early
reports to reach the target, additional names
were drawn from later reports. A few cam-
paigns simply had fewer total contributors
than the target.
For sampling purposes, a cluster consist-
ed of the contributors listed on a single page
of an FEC report. If a report contained seven
names per page, and the report target was 25
names, four pages would be chosen by a ran-
dom process. As this example suggests, there
was a bias during the sampling process to
overfulfill the quota somewhat. This proved
to be advantageous, since a substantial num-
ber of the names sampled proved to be dupli-
cates (as we will discuss below).
A Purposive, Rather than Representative,
Sample
As this description makes clear, this was
not a representative sample of contributors.
For example, to get a representative sample,
the target number of contributors to each
campaign would have to be in proportion to
the total number of contributors, or else the
probability of inclusion of a campaign in the
sample would have to be proportional to the
total number of contributors. Rather, the
number of contributors selected was roughly
equal for each campaign. Further, a represen-
tative sample would have to draw names from
each report in proportion to the total number
of contributors listed. Finally, the inclusion of
an oversample of competitive House races is a
deviation from representativeness.
The sampling design used was chosen to
balance practical and theoretical considera-
tions. Data available from the FEC could be
used to determine the number of contribu-
tors giving $500 or more. But we wanted to
include contributors down to the $200 level.
On the other hand, it would have been quite
practical to set the report target in a way that
gave early contributors (typically fairly few in
number) a probability of inclusion equal to
that of late contributors (typically numer-
ous). It was decided that early contributors
constituted an important analytical category
and that it was important to get a reasonably
large absolute number.
Much the same logic was applied to sever-
al categories of contributors. The sample was
designed to get a reasonably large number of
contributors in highly competitive races, as
well as a reasonable number of contributors
to hopeless, “not a snowball’s chance” cam-
paigns. It was, in other words, a purposive
sample, drawn with an eye to the interesting
questions it was intended to illuminate. This
means, however, that we must be very careful
about saying that “X percent of campaign
contributors” did such and such.
As the data in Table 7 suggest, our sam-
pling procedure served us well for the pur-
pose of studying fat cats. A representative
sample of contributors would have been
rather problematic, since among the ranks
of all contributors fat cats are few in num-
ber. Our sample, in contrast, was pretty
much a sample of contributions. Relative to a
sample of all contributors, it heavily over-
sampled the population of people who
make multiple, frequent contributions. 
Given our purposive sample, readers may
want to be a bit wary of taking the percentages
here as absolute gospel. But the relationships
can be accepted with a good bit of confidence.
There is no reason to believe we have oversam-
pled liberals who give a lot of money or conser-
vatives who give little (or vice versa).
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The Survey
The sampling procedure described above
yielded a total of 4,789 names. These were
entered into a database and screened for
duplicate entries and apparent spouses of
other contributors in the database. The elim-
ination of 528 duplicate entries and 116 con-
tributors who were spouses reduced the
number of potential respondents to 4,145. A
further 60 names had to be eliminated
because of bad addresses; 20 were eliminated
because the respondent was dead or disabled;
and 55 were eliminated when mail was
returned stamped “forwarding order
expired.” Two people insisted that they had
not made a contribution and were included
on the list by mistake. Thus, our sample of
potential respondents totaled 4,008.
Mail questionnaires were sent to potential
respondents during the period May 1989–April
1990. An initial mailing and as many as three
follow-ups (if necessary) were sent. A total of
2,340 usable questionnaires were returned, for a
response rate of 58.4 percent. Nine respondents
removed the identifying information (a serial
number) from the questionnaire and could not
be used in this study.
The questionnaire asked contributors for a
variety of information, including their party
identification, their political opinions, the cir-
cumstances surrounding the contribution,
and their relationship with the candidate.
Further, respondents were asked to rate sever-
al “factors someone might take into account
when deciding to contribute money to a
particular candidate for the U.S. [chamber].”
Another set of questions asked about the
proximate conditions surrounding the con-
tribution. Where the contribution was given
at a fundraising event (such as a dinner, cof-
fee, or reception) respondents where asked
how they got invited to the event. These
series of questions were designed to get at the
all-important question of the incentives that
motivate contributions. 
The next stage of the project involved
searching the digitized records of the FEC for
the names of persons in our sample. The FEC
digitizes campaign contribution records as a
matter of course. For the 1988 election cycle,
persons who made contributions of as little
as $500 are included in the FEC database. In
contrast, in the 1990 and later election cycles,
contributors of as little as $200 are included
in the FEC data. Because of this, and because
the questionnaires were actually adminis-
tered during the 1990 election cycle, we
decided to use FEC data from the 1990 elec-
Table 7
Distribution of Contributions
Contributions Number Percentage
Count of Contributions
0 1,166 50.0%
1 242 10.4%
2 180 7.7%
3 108 4.6%
4–6 212 9.1%
7–9 124 5.4%
10–15 128 5.4%
16 or more 171 7.3%
Aggregate total of contributions
$500 or less 1,405 60.3%
$501 through $5,000 604 25.9%
$5,001 and above 322 13.8
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tion cycle and to add 1992 data to get a
broader base of contributions and a longer
time span to provide a more reliable assess-
ment of contribution activity.
Bob Biersack of the FEC conducted a com-
puterized search of the agency’s records and
supplied to the authors the records of persons
in our sample. This opens up the possibility of
analyzing those contributors who make mul-
tiple contributions. Thus, if an individual fell
into our sample by virtue of having made a
single contribution, data from the FEC allow
us to see what other contributions he or she
made. One complication here arises from the
fact that our sample was based on hard-copy
records and many campaigns voluntarily
reported contributions of $50 or $100, and
where available, we used these names to draw
our survey sample. This raises the possibility
that some persons making multiple, small
contributions will show up in our data as
making (for the 1990 and 1992 election cycles)
zero contributions and contributing zero
aggregate dollars when in fact they are making
contributions. We doubt that any of these
people belong in our fat–cat category (see
below) and doubt that more than a tiny hand-
ful would make it into our moderate contri-
butions category. In sum, our focus was on
fat–cat contributors. Our ability to pull out of
our sample people who made multiple, and
relatively large, contributions allowed us to
identify these people effectively.
Data Problems
Matching contributors in our sample with
FEC records has proven to be a tedious
chore—as anyone who has worked with these
data would expect. The same individual might
be listed under two or three different forms of
his or her name. If records list “Joe Smith” as
making several contributions, and “Joe Smith,
Jr.” as having made additional contributions,
we may have to wonder whether this is two dif-
ferent persons or only one. Further, contribu-
tors will frequently have both a residence and
a work address—and some contributions will
be reported to the FEC under one address and
others under the other. Happily, multiple
pieces of data exist to help sort out these
issues. Our hard-copy records included the
mailing address of the contributor (which was
included in our database), and FEC records
include either the occupation or the place of
work of contributors.
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